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Desirable Amounts of Taxation and Borrowing
AsHAVE SEEN, the immediate practical task of war financ-
ing consists largely in reducing civilian use of resources
needed for the military program and in preventing the infla-
tion that might develop because civilians have more money
to spend on fewer goods. The general role of financial meas-
ures was outlined in Chapter 4, and the progressively impor-
tant role of direct controls, in Chapter 5. We now examine
the principal considerations bearing upon the choice of finan-
cial methods, especially the relative reliance to be placed
upon taxation and borrowing.
Financial methods play a dual role in war. First, to the
extent that we continue to employ competitive prices, the
profit system, and private initiative, financial methods serve
in the ways outlined in Chapter 4 to stimulate output and to
facilitate the diversion of economic activity to the war effort.
Second, the specific financial methods we use influence pro..
foundly the ultimate distribution of the economic costs of
the war among the population; and this second function re-
mains even when direct and detailed governmental prescrip-
tion—by rationing, production restrictions, price-fixing, etc.
—is partly or largely substituted for finance in the first func-
tion. Thus, even if a universal rationing system imposed an
approximately uniform level of consumption upon all citi-
zens during the war, the ultimate distribution of the eco-
nomic costs of the war among them would vary according to
the manner and extent to which the government promised to
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reimburse them in the future for their unequal sacrifices and
services in the present.
In practice, important areas of economic activity will con-
tinue to exist even in 'total war' within which the influence
of financial incentives and financial guides to production and
consumption cannot wisely be ignored. Further, the very ef-
fectiveness of the direct controls will be conditioned in some
fields by the government's financial policies. If, for example,
the government's fiscal methods do not succeed in mopping
up private money incomes sufficiently, its rationing and price
restrictions will become more difficult to enforce. Surplus
money incomes that cannot be spent in the lawful markets
will tend to overflow into 'black' or illegal markets, driving
up prices in the latter and, even worse, providing large re-
wards for the diversion of resources from military to civilian
uses.
We shall find that our choice among the combinations of
financial methods open to us will be properly influenced by
several considerations of both immediate and longer-run char-
acter. The possible combinations of methods differ in the
way they distribute the immediate economic sacrifices of war
among the population; in the degree to which they preserve
or modify inequalities in the distribution of wealth; in their
psychological effects upon the public, and in the private eco-
nomic incentives they offer for extra wartime effort; and in
their postwar effects upon our monetary system. These and
similar considerations will enter into our analysis in this
chapter and will receive further attention later in the book.
1 THE SPENDING BALANCE
To avoid inflation and otherwise to promote the war pro-
gram, one objective of financial methods and direct controls
alike should be to achieve what may be termed a 'spending
balance'. Aggregate spending, public and private, should ap-
proximate that needed to take up the total output of goods
without substantial change in the price level. However pro-AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING 129
digious the increase in the government's spending, a spending
balance can be achieved and maintained if this increase is
offset by the combination of a reduction in private spending
and an expansion in the output of real goods and services.
A spending balance for our war economy as a whole is pos-
sible even if the federal budget remains heavily unbalanced
and the public debt increases enormously. These develop-
ments might create difficulties in the long run, but to the
extent that they are accompanied by increases in output and
reductions in current civilian spending—as by the use of civil-
ian incomes to purchase government bonds instead of goods
—they are compatible with the maintenance of a spending
balance in the short run.
During the first year or so following the inauguration of
the defense program in May 1940, the increase in government
spending was more than matched by the accompanying in-
crease in the national output. Consequently, the expansion
in private spending did not raise prices much. During the
fiscal year 1942, however, the sharp increase in the govern-
ment's spending was not fully offset by the accompanying in-
crease in output or by a curtailment of private spending, and
prices rose significantly. During the fiscal year 1943 govern-
ment spending is scheduled to leap to the huge sum of $76
billion, while only modest further increases can be expected
in the national output. In consequence, a close approach to
a spending balance will require that civilians forego the pri-
vate spending of an amount of current money income equal
roughly to total government expenditures; and they must
also forego, on net balance, the private spending of accumu-
lated liquid balances.
To some extent, the total of the government's projected
outlays overstates the net curtailment that will be required in
private spending to maintain a spending balance. Several im-
portant outlays of the federal government, such as those for
interest on the accumulated public debt, pensions, and relief
payments, are not 'exhaustive'; that is, they do not represent130 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
the current use of manpower, materials, etc., and SO do not
reduce the real resources available for private consumption.
The like is true of expenditures for the purchase of land and
other previously accumulated resources, prepayments for
goods to be produced in the future, and purchases in other
countries. In addition, civilian spending may draw upon the
exceedingly large stocks of goods with which we started the
war.
While the gross total of government outlays therefore over-
states the net curtailment required in private spending, the
aggregate overstatement on these accounts, which we estimate
roughly at $5 billion for the fiscal year 1943, is not large in
relation to the projected total outlays. For this reason and be-
cause the gross national product during the fiscal year 1943
is likely to be at its immediately realizable maximum, we may
conclude that the government must absorb or otherwise im-
mobilize a gross amount of private money income roughly
approximating its own total outlays if a close approach to a
spending balance is to be achieved and maintained.
2 CHIEF METHODS OF LIMITING PRIVATE SPENDING
The principal methods by which private money incomes can
be absorbed or immobilized are four: The government may
i)rely in part upon the normal tendency of civilians to save
but may greatly reduce the private use of such savings by
priorities, allocations, and other direct limitations upon
the purchase of construction materials, machinery, trans-
portation,. etc.;
2)induce additional private saving by vigorous publicity
campaigns to sell its securities and by limiting the pur-
chase of various consumer goods through rationing and
similar procedures, and by sales, excise, and other taxes
designed primarily to discourage spending rather than to
raise revenue;
3)directly reduce the spendable income of civilians by more
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4) reduce the spendable income of civilians by forced loans.
The first two, in practice, involve government borrowing
from voluntary lenders. The fourth also involves government
borrowing, but on a compulsory basis. Only the third avoids
an increase in the public debt.
3'VOLUNTARY' RESTRICTION ON PRIVATE SPENDING WILL BE
SUBSTANTIAL
We know from experience that, so far as consumers are con-
cerned, a substantial part of the necessary restriction of pri-
vate spending is likely to be voluntary because consumers tend
to save a sizeable portion of their money incomes, particu-
larly when these incomes are increasing.1 We saw in Chapter
that if national income payments rose from $8 i billion to
$109 billion under certain peacetime conditions, consumers
would be likely to increase their expenditures by less than 6o
per cent of the increases in their incomes.2 Some of the re-
mainder would be spent on gifts and direct taxes, but most
of it would be save& The altered distribution of income in
favor of the lower income groups during the war will tend
to reduce the expected proportion of savings. On the other
hand, unusual encouragements to saving will also be opera-
tive. Well planned, vigorous, and Continuous 'selling cam-
paigns' may induce large numbers of wage earners and others
to buy government securities with a portion of every pay
check. The wartime impact of priorities, allocations, and ra-
tioning in reducing or eliminating the availability of numer-
ous important consumer goods, such as automobiles and elec-
tric refrigerators, may be counted on to exert an even more
powerful influence toward saving. A man who is prevented
from buying an automobile because his job does not entitle
him to a preferential status is not likely to spend the entire
purchase money for other goods: he is likely to save some
of it.
The private use of these savings and of the gross savings of
business enterprises for non-military purposes is made diffi-132 FISCAL PLANNING FOR. TOTAL WAR
cult by governmental restrictions upon the purchase of con-
struction materials, plant equipment, and inventories, and it
may be further limited by restrictions upon granting bank
credit and upon the issue, of new corporate and other securi-
ties. Even outlays intended merely to replace the wear and
tear of industrial plant and equipment and of residential and
commercial property are obstructed. Thus, through its pri-
orities, allocations, and rationing, the government not only
influences consumers to spend less, but it also greatly restricts
or completely blocks many of the most important private in-
vestment outlets for their savings and for the gross savings of
business enterprises. The purchase of shares in building and
loan associations, the payment of life insurance premiums,
and additions to savings bank accounts will formally continue
to absorb some of the savings, but the receiving institutions
will find relatively few new mortgages or new corporate secu-
rities to buy with these funds. They may buy 'old' securities;
but this merely transfers the problem of investment to the
sellers of the latter. The accumulation of liquid balances in
the form of currency and bank deposits, and the direct pur-
chase of government securities are left as the principal outlets
for private savings.
To the extent that consumers and business enterprises buy
government securities directly with portions of their current
money incomes,corresponding amount of their funds is, of
course, transferred to the government. But to the extent that
they keep their current savings in the form of idle currency
and commercial bank deposits, the government may borrow
(and spend) an equivalent amount from commercial banks
without causing a net increase in total spending. In the latter
case, aggregate currency and bank deposits in the country will
be nominally increased, and this may be objectionable for
reasons that will be noted presently; but the increase will not
upset the current spending balance if it represents only an
offset to amounts of current money incomes that individuals
and business enterprises have decided to hold as idle cash.AMOUNTS OF TAXATION BORROWING
Whether government borrowing is from individuals or from
commercial banks is of considerable moment, especially for
the future, but it is not the decisive question in connection
with the maintenance of the spending balance. The real ques-
tion is whether the amount of government borrowing (and
taxing) represents an equal curtailment of private spending.
Borrowing Reinforced by Direct Controls
In contra-distinction to the compulsory restriction of total
private spending the government can accomplish by taxation
and compulsory loans, we have termed 'voluntary' the restric-
tion reflected by the accumulation of idle cash balances and
the unforced purchase of government securities from current
money incomes. In point of fact, however, the distinction be-
tween 'voluntary' and 'compulsory' is often blurred. If 90 per
cent of the workers in a plant have 'signed up' to have a given
proportion of each pay check deducted for the purchase of
war bonds and savings stamps, a strong degree of coercion is
inevitably exerted upon the remaining io per cent of the em-
ployees to do likewise. Similarly, if rationing restrictions pre-
vent a man from buying more than a limited (if any) amount
of each of a long list of popular consumer goods, and his de-
sire for other goods is already fairly well satisfied, he is likely
to add to his bank balance or his holdings of war bonds. Al-
though the government has not specifically compelled him to
save more of his money income, his additional savings can
scarcely be said to be purely voluntary. On the other hand,
an increase in taxes may fail to produce a commensurate re-
duction in private spending because the higher taxes may be
paid with funds which would have -been saved in any event—
the effect of the compulsory restriction being offset by a re-
duction in voluntary saving.
In past wars extensive reliance upon voluntary lending has
commonly led to substantial price inflation because it has not
usually been accompanied by a sufficient restriction of private
spending. In this war this weakness of voluntary loans has134 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
been overcome or offset in large degree by the enormous and
effective use of non-fiscal limitations upon private spending;
that is, by priorities, production restrictions, allocations, and
rationing. As just indicated, when the governmental authori-
ties place rigid limits upon the physical quantities of many
of the necessaries and common luxuries an individual may
purchase, establish effective controls over the prices at which
these goods are sold, and bar nearly all important avenues
of private investment, a substantial curtailment of private
spending is brought about even in the absence of additional
taxation. Cash balances pile up and government securities
are purchased because the competing uses for funds are re-
stricted. Thus, in England and Germany the kinds of goods
controlled by direct rationing restrictions have become so
numerous and inclusive that the effective power of money to
command goods has been greatly impaired. In consequence,
judged by the accumulation of idle cash balances and indi-
vidual and business subscriptions to government war loans,
'voluntary' saving has increased tremendously; and, despite
large amounts of government borrowing from commercial
banks, the rise of prices during 1941andthe first six months
of 1942waskept within narrow limits.
The greater readiness and ability of all governments to
adopt direct controls in this war can be attributed in part to
greater recognition of the limitations of the price system in
an emergency (see Chapter 5); and in further part to a new ap-
preciation that modern war makes comprehensive demands
upon a nation's entire economy. But fundamental to this
development has been the great technological progress in
recent decades in manufacturing, transportation, and com-
munication. This progress has strikingly furthered centralized
control by government.
The restriction of consumption and investment brought
about by rationing possesses some distinct advantages over
that effected by purely fiscal measures; that is, by taxation or
by borrowing unsupplemented by direct controls. By ration-AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING 135
ing the government can better control the directions and
amounts of physical curtailment than by taxation or ordinary
borrowing. Restrictions upon consumption become more ac-
ceptable to the public generally because inequalities due to
differences in wealth or income are eliminated or minimized.
The well-to-do, who might otherwise maintain their level of
consumption, despite higher taxes, by saving less currently
and drawing upon their accumulated savings, are forced to
curtail. And when the curtailment that rationing accom-
plishes is accompanied by an increase in the individual's cash
balance or in his holdings of government securities, he has
the satisfaction of being compensated for his current sacrifice.
Rationing Total Spending Power
An interesting, suggestive, and logical extension of the ra-
tioning device to restrict private consumption and prevent
inflation during wartime was projected by Michael Kalecki
of Oxford University in an article in the (London) Banker
of October 1941Mr.Kalecki proposed that a limit be placed
on the sum any individual or family might spend at retail
during each week, month, or quarter. The limit could be
uniform for all, as Mr. Kalecki originally suggested, or it
could be made to vary with the size of income, thereby pre-
serving some degree of inequality in current consumption.
Regardless of the amount of his total liquid resources or
of his current income, the retail spending of the individual
(or family) would be limited to the amount stipulated for his
income class. Coupons to the value of the weekly, monthly,
or quarterly spending ration would be distributed to all indi-
viduals or families and all retail purchases. would require
payment in these coupons, as well as in money for the full
amount of the purchases. Shopkeepers would be able to re-
plenish their stocks from wholesalers and manufacturers only
by surrendering coupons to the amount of the retail value of
the goods ordered. Mr. Kalecki suggested in addition that his
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family allowances: those whose money incomes were riot
enough to enable them to use the entire minimum allotment
of coupons would be permitted to sell one-half of the re-
mainder to the government. The proceeds of such sale and
the rest of their coupons could then be spent on further
purchases.
When fairly general and stringent curtailment of consump-
tion is required, upon total spending, in addition
to rationing certain goods, might prove a powerful and oth-
erwise valuable instrument for enforcing and distributing
restrictions upon consumption, provided its administrative
feasibility could be established. It would not eliminate the
need for rationing scarce necessities, but it would tend
reduce the number of goods that required rationing. It
prevent an inflationary spilling over of money demand from
rationed goods to those free from specific restrictions; and,
by narrowing the area within which specific rationing was
needed, it would make consumers' choice freer. In all these
ways it would reduce the administrative task of specific ra-
tioning. It would, in effect, solve the problem that excessive
money incomes bring by suspending for the duration the
power of money, unsupplemented by rationing coupons, to
command goods in general; and it would provide a method
for an equitable distribution of the necessary immediate
sacrifices.
It would leave other problems unsolved. Unless the un-
spentincomes were absorbed by taxation, they would ac-
cumulate in the form of currency and bank deposits or
be invested in government securities. In either form, they
would remain as claims upon the future and could easily
become great enough to create serious monetary and fiscal
problems after the war, as we shall note again presently. To
keep these problems within manageable proportions, restric-
tion by this as by other forms of rationing would have to be
supplemented by extensive taxation or, as a partial alterna-
tive, by compulsory lending.AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING 137
Spendings Tax
A different proposal with a similar objective calls for a gradu-
ated tax on the expended portion of incomes, with certain
exemptions. Outlays for life insurance premiums, debt repay-
ments, and capital assets, including bank deposits, govern-
ment bonds, etc., would not be taxed; but graduated rates
would be imposed upon all other expenditures, after a small
personal exemption, with possible exceptions for limited
amounts paid for medical services, charitable contributions,
etc.
Such a tax would differ from ordinary sales and excise
taxes: it would be deliberately designed to restrict spending
rather than to raise revenue, its rates would be graduated to
vary directly with total expenditures, and personal exemp-
tions and similar allowances would be easily possible. It
would differ from the personal income tax because only the
expended portions of incomes (and of receipts from sales of
property, gifts, etc.) would be taxed, the saved portion being
completely exempt. If the rate schedule were severe enough
—rising, for example, to several hundred per cent on all ex-
penditures in excess of a stated annual sum—it might accom-
plish many of the same purposes as the rationing of total
spending power. The measure of its success would lie rather
in the amount of spending it prevented than in the amount
of revenue it raised.
4 BORROWING VERSUS TAXATION
To the extent that the government relies upon voluntary sav-
ings and rationing to curtail private spending, it usually ob-
tains the funds for its own spending by borrowing.4 To the
extent that it employs compulsion through fiscal methods to
restrict private spending, taxation is the usual weapon, with
compulsory lending a supplementary possibility. Tradition-
ally, the principal controversy of war finance has centered on
the extent to which resort should be had to borrowing as138 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WA.R
against taxation, as alternative sources of government funds
and as alternative means of restricting private spending.
Despite its many disadvantages, the principal of which will
be noted below, borrowing from voluntary lenders may play
a highly useful role in war finance. It is capable of diverting
large amounts of current savings to the use of the govern-
ment, and of doing it more quickly and more effectively than
is usually possible by taxation. It taps depreciation,
and replacement funds that cannot be reached easily or equi-
tably by taxation. It is more flexible as between individuals
and as between enterprises than taxation, avoiding hardship
for those with heavy responsibilities or urgent business needs
for funds, and yet permitting those who can spare most to
make their maximum current contributions to the govern-
ment. This flexibility and the absence or smaller degree of
compulsion permit the transfer to the government of sizeable
amounts of purchasing power with minimum disturbance to
the financial programs of individuals and enterprises. Fur-
ther, borrowing interferes far less than taxation with the
financial incentives to production, and is far less apt to un-
pair public morale. When a man or a firm receives Treasury
bonds or notes in exchange for his money, the subjective
effect is very different than if he were to receive a tax receipt.
In the latter case, the lender's private wealth is reduced; in
the former, it is not.
But, while borrowing from voluntary lenders offers many
advantages for reaching funds that would be saved in any
event, it is a weak instrument for inducing large increases in
private saving. In general, taxation is apt to be far more effec-
tive for actually curtailing private consumption. Additional
taxes not only reduce the current funds of the taxpayer—the
purchase of government bonds will do that; they also make
him feel poorer, and so disposes him to extra economies. When
an individual lends money to the government on the other
hand, he is apt to obtain more of the funds by reducing his
other forms of savings, such as a larger bank balance, life in-AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING 139
surance, savings accounts, than by curtailing his current con-
sumption. The desire to serve one's country can far more
easily lead people to single acts of great energy and courage
than to a long series of small self-denials.
Taxation an Aid to Rationing
It is true, as we have seen, that the weak restrictive influence
of voluntary lending upon private spending may be reinforced
by direct controls—by priorities, allocations, and rationing; but
extreme dependence upon such controls, unsupported by
fiscal compulsion, accentuates the administrative difficulties
and policing problems they involve. The effectiveness of ra-
tioning is enhanced when taxation rather than voluntary
lending is used to absorb surplus money incomes. When the
funds are not taken by taxes, they can spill over into unre-
stricted avenues of expenditure. To the extent that the pro-
ductive resources engaged in the unrestricted lines are under-
employed and are unsuitable for military production, this is
an advantage. Such a condition may well exist in connection
with amusement and recreation facilities. But to the extent
that the unrestricted lines are only somewhat less vital to the
war effort than the restricted, or are already operating at
capacity, the diversion of spending to them will necessitate
the extension of direct controls to them. Likewise, the polic-
ing needed to prevent the development of 'black' markets for
the purchase and sale of rationed goods and to prevent the
bidding up of prices is likely to be much less if the greater
part of the surplus money incomes that tempt people to eva-
sion is taxed away.
In brief, although the curtailment which may be brought
about through direct controls possesses some real advantages
over that possible by purely fiscal methods, these advantages
must not be interpreted as favoring borrowing over taxation.
The extensive adoption of direct controls is no less com-
patible with an enlarged use of taxation than with an en-
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money incomes. The rationing procedures that make borrow-
ing easier and safer also make heavy taxation more practi-
cable. And when borrowing rather than taxation is used to
absorb the private funds dammed up by rationing and price
fixing, monetary and fiscal problems are created for the future.
5 DISADVANTAGES OF UNNECESSARY INCREASES IN PUBLIC DEBT
Extensive reliance upon borrowing, compulsory or voluntary,
regardless of how strongly the latter is reinforced by direct
controls, has several distinct disadvantages. Borrowing leaves
a debt, the interest and principal payments on which remain
a burden on the fiscal system long after the war is over. Tax-
ation, in contrast, has the enormous advantage of absorbing
excess money incomes without creating a troublesome legacy
for the future.
As noted in Chapter i, the war must be mainly paid for as
it is fought. If we finance it by borrowing instead of by tax-
ing, the additions to private property we create in the form
of Treasury bonds do not represent equal additions to the
country's real wealth: the goods which purchase of these
bonds enables the government to buy are being mainly shot
away or otherwise used up. In consequence, the future bur-
den of the debt will be a 'deadweight'.
Further, financing by borrowing tends to make future in-
equalities in the distribution of income greater than if the
financing were by taxation. A well-to-do person is naturally
able both to pay heavier taxes and to buy more bonds than a
poor person. To the extent that the financing is by taxation,
the heavier contributions of the rich are evidenced by tax
receipts which have no claim on the future. But to the extent
that the financing is by borrowing, the heavier purchase of
bonds by the rich gives them a greater claim on the future
income of the country. To pay interest and principal on these
bonds, the children and grandchildren of today's poor would
have to pay over part of their incomes through the govern-
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tendency could be counteracted by imposing heavier taxes
on the well-to-do in the future. But this possibility exists
whether the debt is increased or not. Hence, except to the
extent that the heavier debt itself may be relied on to cause
future increases in the relative tax burden upon the rich,
borrowing tends to make the future distribution of income
more unequal than if taxation were used.5
The fiscal problem involved in raising large additional
sums annually for debt service is difficult, although virtually
all the taxes paid by Americans to service the debt will also
be received by Americans (foreigners will hold a negligible
proportion of the debt), and these receipts will be subject to
taxation in the hands of the recipients. A special tax of ioo
per cent on all receipts of interest on the government's war
debt would be obviously inequitable. Since taxpayers are not
likely to be holders of the government's bonds in amounts
nicely proportional to their incomes from other sources, no
mechanical adjustment of the income tax rates could be de-
pended upon to make the bondholders pay their own interest.
In short, from the standpoint of its demands upon the tax
system, an advance in interest charges presents much the same
problem of new revenues or reductions in other expenditures
as any other new outlays by the government. An increase
in debt charges is therefore often a threat to the continu-
ance or expansion of federal outlays for various desirable social
services and other governmental activities. And, because in-
terest charges constitute an inflexible item in the budget,
they become especially burdensome in bad times when the
national income and tax receipts decline. According to the
revised budget estimates, issued April 24, 1942, a public debt
of $125 billion is expected by June 30, 1943. If the average
interest rate on this debt is limited to 2 per cent, government
annual interest requirements of $2.5 billion on that date will
be more than double those of any preceding year in our
history and will be greater than the total yield of the tax on
individual incomes in any year between 1917 and 1941.142 FISCAL PLANNING FOR. TOTAL WAR
These well known disadvantages of a larger public debt
are not decisive, of course, under all circumstances. They
compete with other considerations in both wartime and
peacetime. But they are especially pertinent in wartime be-
cause the amounts involved dwarf those commonly involved
in peacetime borrowing, and because huge wartime increases
in the public debt may make future peacetime borrowing
more difficult. The contemplated net addition of approxi-
mately $76 billion to the interest-bearing public debt during
the two years ending June 30, 1943, as forecast in the revised
budget estimates, is more than two and a half times the entire
increase in the direct and guaranteed debt of the federal gov-
ernment during the entire eight years ended June 30, 1940.
During the great depression of the 'thirties, government
borrowing and spending were on a considerable scale in this
and several other countries in order to mitigate the economic
waste and the human suffering entailed by widespread un-
employment. It is to be hoped that we shall some day devise
other means than the creation of interest-bearing public debt
to maintain a high level of employment and national income
in the face of recurring shrinkages in private spending. Mean-
while, however, it is clearly desirable to avoid the creation of
any unnecessary obstacles to the peacetime use of deficit
spending in times of need.
Postwar Inflation
A grave danger of relying too largely upon voluntary lending,
however reinforced by rationing, is postwar inflation. The
more serious inflations of the first World War period oc-
curred after rather than during the war. When the govern-
ment relies heavily upon voluntary loans, the liquid assets of
the public, cash and securities, expand by roughly, the same
amount. If the borrowing is from commercial banks, it is the
public's cash that is increased, for as the government spends
its newly created deposits, they get into the possession of the
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enterprises, the latter comeS into the possession of easily mar-
ketable or redeemable securities.
These additions to the total supply of the public's liquid
assets may be harmless during the war, especially if the direct
restrictions upon private spending are extensive. But at the
close of the war, such restrictions are likely to be removed
rapidly, and, even if the attempt is made to continue them,
their effectiveness is likely to become greatly impaired be-
cause of diminished support by public opinion. At such a
time, huge idle cash balances and marketable or redeemable
government securities in the hands of the public will be ac-
companied by accumulated shortages in housing, in con-
sumer durable goods, and in plant and equipment for the
manufacture of civilian products. Under these conditions,
even an extremely rapid conversion of industry to the pro-
duction of civilian goods might not suffice to prevent dis-
orderly price rises and boom conditions.
The danger of deferred inflationary influences arising from
large government borrowing is doubtless greater if the bor-
rowing is from banks than if it is from individuals and busi-
ness enterprises, for additions to the public's cash are likely
to stimulate more spending than equal additions to its hold-
ings of securities. Nevertheless, the difference is often exag-
gerated. Some persons mistakenly contend that any amount
of borrowing will have no inflationary consequences if only
it comes from the genuine savings of individuals and enter-
prises, and that even a small amount of borrowing from com-
mercial banks is necessarily inflationary because it leads to an
increase in bank deposits. We have several times called atten-
tion to the error involved in the latter belief, for borrowing
from commercial banks may merely offset hoarded money. As
respects the former, the point is ignored that the possession
of marketable government securities may greatly speed up
private spending under favorable conditions by inducing
people to spend their cash more actively. Such securities serve
as a good substitute for cash reserves, and may even serve as144 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
money itself. Liberty Bonds were accepted in payment for all
manner of goods for some years after the first World War.
Unless and until the Treasury securities issued during the
war get into the hands of investors who intend to hold them
indefinitely as investments, they may, under favoring circum-
stances, produce many of the same effects as an excessive vol-
ume of money.
There are some who, fearing that the greater postwar dan-
ger is unemployment and business collapse, regard the accu-
mulation by the public of large cash balances and enormous
amounts of marketable securities as a wholesome antidote to
this contingency. As against this view, it may be argued that
the possibility of an immediate postwar boom is at least as
real as that of a slump; and that whereas a present policy of
minimizing an increase in the public debt and in money will
leave the government's hands free with respect to any volume
of public spending which may be needed in the event of a
threatened slump, the opposite policy in the present may well
leave the government powerless to control a postwar inflation,
should the latter threaten. The maintenance of, or actual
increases beyond, the wartime rates of taxation, together with
a drastic reduction in federal expenditures, would be needed
in the latter case to offset the expansion of private spending.
But the end of a war and the resumption of peace are apt to
make increases in wartime tax rates, or even their mairite-
nance, extremely difficult politically.
6 UNDESIRABLE EFFECTS OF OPPRESSIVE TAXATION
The foregoing considerations create a powerful presumption
in favor of financing the war by a minimum of borrowing
and a maximum of taxation. But other considerations exert
a coercive influence in the opposite direction. One is the use-
fulness of retaining the strength and reliability of private
gain as a motive force in organizing and maximizing produc-
tion. Extreme rates of taxation, particularly when applied to
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of impairing this force. If, for example, a tax of ioo per cent
were imposed upon all business profits in excess of the prewar
average, or upon those exceeding 6 per cent on the invested
capital, enterprises which were already earning more would
be deprived of all private economic incentive for further im-'
provements in efficiency and further reductions in cost, and
even for the full maintenance of former standards of effi-
ciency. The usual restraints upon wasteful expenditures
would be greatly weakened because such expenditures would
be paid for, in effect, by the government. Advertising outlays
to build up a long-run goodwill would become exceptionally
attractive, and it would become much less worth while than
previously to resist rises in prices charged by suppliers, de-
mands for higher wage rates, and the development of small
wastes. Similarly, if all increases in individual incomes during
the war were to be taxed away, the private incentive for extra
effort would be snuffed out. The danger is much less if any
part of the increase in income is left to the individual or to
the business enterprise; nevertheless it remains grave when-
ever the marginal rates are high. A worker who receives a
dollar an hour for an eight-hour day might well be willing
to work an additional two or three hours at an overtime rate
of $1.50 an hour, and in some cases even at the regular rate;
but if his overtime compensation is subject to an income tax
rate of 50 per cent, whereas his regular compensation, be-
cause of personal exemption, etc., largely escapes taxation or
is taxed at very low rates, the financial incentive for overtjme
work is greatly weakened.
In partial qualification of the foregoing, it should be noted
that heavy taxation may also stimulate effort. Many men may
work harder in order to maintain their customary standard of
living in the face of higher taxes. Similarly, many business
managements will be stimulated to seek extra economies and
extra improvements in efficiency in order to maintain their
established levels of dividend payments. This tendency of
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overcome the effects of bigger total taxes is most conspicuous,
however, when the taxes are determined substantially with-
out regard to current increases in income, or when the in-
crease in taxes takes merely a small share of the increase in
income. In the short run, this tends to be true of property
taxes, of taxes levied as a percentage of invested capital, and,
in less degree, of the normal and first bracket rates of the
individual and corporate income tax. Large increases in these
types of tax may be compatible with the maintenance of ade-
quate private financial incentives, for they bear relatively
lightly if at all upon the extraamountsof income resulting
from extraeffortor efficiency. Thus, from the standpoint of
direct incentives (though not from other standpoints to be
noted presently), it would be preferable to place extra heavy
taxes on prewar or normal individual incomes and prewar
or normal business profits than on the wartime increases. Al-
though other objectives of tax policies would make it unwise
to formulate a tax program with reference solely to the main-
tenance of private economic incentives, this objective cannot
prudently be ignored altogether.
The incentive force of private gain would be of small im-
portance if, at the outbreak of war, the government could
quickly and efficiently introduce detailed rules for the com-
plete regulation of economic activity. Compulsion would
largely take its place. But in point of fact, a detailed and com-
prehensive plan has never existed even on paper, and the
enormous organization that would be needed to execute and
administer it could not be improvised in a few months. Many
persons are inclined to exaggerate the extent and character
of governmental control of economic activity in wartime
America, as in wartime Britain.6 Direct examination of the
powers actually exercised will reveal that the control is not
nearly as thoroughgoing as it seems to be. It takes the form
of prohibition and limitation primarily, rather than of posi-
tive commands. Nearly all internal management and a ].arge
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have remained free from interference. A considerable lati-
tude for initiative and discretion is left for capital, manage-
ment, and labor. In guiding the exercise of such initiative
and discretion, economic incentives may play a highly useful
role in wartime, leading management tà watch costs and
avoid wastes, leading labor to work longer and harder than
otherwise and voluntarily to enter the occupations most in
demand, and stimulating capital to exercise ingenuity and
speed in diverting facilities to military work. Although out-
right compulsion offers definite advantages in various areas,
it is always purchased at the cost of considerable administra-
tive effort; and although patriotism alone is a powerful force
and highly effective insomespheres, it is less reliable for
guiding daily humdrum activities than for inducing acts of
concentrated sacrifice. By supplementing compulsion and pa-
triotism with private economic incentives, we harness to war-
time needs a force that economizes administrative burdens and
operates steadily through fluctuations in moral fervor. Unless
and until direct governmental compulsion can usefully be
made detailed and comprehensive enough to provide an ade-
quate substitute, we must be wary of an excessive impair-
ment of the private economic incentives upon which our
peacetime economic system is mainly organized.
The advantage of borrowing over taxation in this connec-
tion is that the former enables us to utilize the incentive of
private gain to a greater degree, yet avoid offering this in-
centive in the form of present goods. Instead of taxing away
extra wages and extra profits, we borrow them away. Indi-
viduals and enterprises accumulate bank balances and gov-
ernment securities which will be cashed and spent mainly in
the future, or only the interest on which will be spent for a
long time to come; yet these claims upon the future may for
a considerable period constitute adequately effective rewards
for extra economic effort. Undoubtedly some part of the
extra wages and extra profits is likely in individual cases to
be spent for present goods and services, and this is unfortu-148 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
nate; though it may be offset by extra saving on the part of
others.
Civilian Morale
A second, though rela ted, consideration that restrains resort
to drastic taxation is the possible damage to civilian morale.
There can be little doubt that a feeling of financial wellbeing
and of financial progress on the part of individuals and busi-
ness enterprises can contribute significantly to morale. A box
containing $i,000 in government bonds may represent just as
great a sacrifice of current spending as a box containing
$1,000 of receipted tax bills, but most persons would feel bet-
ter in possession of the former. The feeling of enhanced finan-
cial security born with the acquisition of the bonds would be
a strong stimulant to morale. In contrast, taxation so drastic
as to compel large numbers of wage and salaried workers to
allow their life insurance policies to lapse in default of funds
for the payment of premiums, or to force them to discontinue
or to trench upon their other forms of individual and family
savings, such as savings bank accounts and mortgage payments
on residences, could seriously depress the morale of the gen-.
eral public. The same can be said of such stringent taxation
of business profits as would prevent the accumulation of cus-
tomary reserves and of additional reserves against the un-
certainties of postwar adjustments.
No competition with the war effort is entailed by permit-
ting individuals and business enterprises to continue such
private savings programs, provided the savings are directly
or indirectly siphoned off for the use of the government.
Life insurance premiums, savings bank accounts, installments
on mortgages, etc., do not impinge appreciably upon produc-
tive resources. So long as the creditors or other institutions
that receive them are prevented from investing them in other
ways, if only by the absence of competing investments, the
bulk of the funds will become available for investment in
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ing as against taxation makes for less disruption of private
programs for individual, family, and business security, and
may positively aid these programs, exerts a potent influence
in favor of borrowing.
Resort to drastic taxation is impeded in the early part of
the war because the tolerance of the public for a given scale
of rates is closely related to the scale in force. Rates which
would require violent adjustments by the public would tend
to be regarded as oppressive even if they were high merely
relatively to those previously in force. The public might tol-
erate a doubling of its federal income tax payments in each
of several succeeding years, whereas a sudden rise of several
hundred per cent in a single year might be regarded as in-
tolerable. For this reason, resort to relatively heavier bor-
rowing may be necessary in the early period of the war than
later.
In practice, large increases in taxation commonly make for
immediate changes in the relative distribution of income and
hence are almost certain to produce heated political contro-
versy. Since the incomes of the middle and upper income
groups allow a greater margin above subsistence requirements
than those of the lower, the former must expect to bear a
disproportionately large share of increases in taxes, just as
they must expect to buy a disproportionately large share of
bonds to the extent that the financing takes place by borrow-
ing. It is natural that they should resist heavily dispropor-
tionate advances in taxes. On the other hand, some repre-
sentatives of the tower income groups will contend that levies
on the well-to-do do not go far enough if they leave the latter
at all significantly better off than members of the lower in-
come groups. Such controversies may conceivably become so
acute as to jeopardize the moral unity of the country and its
concentration upon the war effort. Financing by borrowing
reduces the area and heat of such controversies because it
entails no immediate change in the relative distribution of
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their relative advantage in money incomes, but they will in-
vest a disproportionately large part of their incomes in gov-
ernment securities. The question of the future distribution
of the burden of debt remains: who shall pay the additional
taxes needed to service and retire the debt? Thus, borrowing
does not finally avoid or solve the problem of distributing
the costs of the war. But by postponing that problem, it re-
moves a potent source of domestic controversy during the
war. Further, even the future problem may be indefinitely
postponed in large part if reductions in the public debt are
avoided except when convenient or desirable for special rea-
sons. Such a policy would restrict the need for additional
taxes to the amounts required to pay interest alone on the
war debt. Various objections may be raised to prolonging
such a policy indefinitely, but its obvious political advan-
tages have doubtless been responsible, in some measure, at
least, for its traditional use by Great Britain and France.
The requirements of civilian morale do not all run in one
direction, however, and they are in partial opposition to the
desirability of avoiding types of taxation which impair pri-
vate financial incentives. The considerations we have noted
call for relatively lighter taxation and greater resort to bor-
rowing than would otherwise be indicated; but they apply
most clearly to the lower and middle income groups. The
situation with respect to large incomes is different. Gross
inequalities in income are important sources of discontent
even in ordinary times, and especially so in wartime. The
spectacle or even the suspicion of large profits being garnered
in the munitions and other war industries provokes wide-
spread dissatisfaction; and unusual increases in and
salaries in civilian industries are little less resented. When
sacrifice is universal, equitable considerations are greatly en-
hanced; and the heavy taxation of all large incomes and un-
usual profits may well be essential to the maintenance of a
high state of morale and a spirit of national unity. The
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financial incentives tend to be modified in the short run by
several factors:(i) A considerable proportion of very large
individual incomes and high rates of business profits is
tributable to investments and decisions made in the past, and
to this extent their unusual gains depend little upon the cur-
rent decisions of the recipients. A large income from invest-
merits reported by the heir to a large estate may be cited as
one of the many examples of this factor.(2) The training
and experience of most salaried executives of large corpora-
tions is such that they are likely to discharge their duties
with the same competence and energy as when their in-
comes were not heavily taxed. Thedesire to maintain
'goodwill' stimulates efficient administration. Inpart, as
we have noted, effective and sometimes superior substitutes
for private financial incentives may be provided by senti-
ments of patriotism, on the one hand, and by outright gov-
ernment compulsion and supervision, on the other.
Despite the welter of complex and often contradictory in-
fluences, it is clear that taxation may in fact be so heavy and
take such forms as to reduce the aggregate national output
through its impairment of private financial incentives and of
civilian morale in general; and that considerations of this
character cannot wisely be ignored in the formulation of war-
time fiscal policy.
7 TAXATION AND THE INFLATIONARY GAP
Earlier in this chapter we indicated that our economy as a
whole could achieve and maintain a spending balance,
thereby avoiding inflation for the time being, even if the
public debt increased enormously. The spending balance
would be maintained if only the increase in government out-
lays was matched by a combination of larger total output and
curtailed private spending, regardless whether the latter is
achieved by taxation or by borrowing. Subsequently, however,
we showed that the method is not a matter of indiffer-
ence, and that, with the important qualifications just dis-152 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
cussed which will receive further attention presently, a pow-
erful presumption exists in favor of taxation. Nevertheless,
we have also just seen that several considerations point to the
desirability of substantial borrowing.
A competing view that has received considerable support
is that only so much taxation is desirable as is needed to sup-
plement voluntary curtailment in achieving a spending bal-
ance. It stresses that people tend to consume progressively
smaller shares of additions to their incomes and to save pro-
pressively larger shares. In the language of John Maynard
Keynes, the marginal propensity to consume diminishes and
the marginal propensity to save increases. The fear is that tax-
ation greater than that needed to supplement voluntary sav-
ing in order to achieve a spending balance would lead to a
disproportionate reduction in consumption expenditures and,
thereby, to a contraction of the national income and a wastage
of productive capacity.
Many students have found the Keynesian concepts of the
'marginal propensity to consume' and the 'multiplier' highly
illuminating in analyzing peacetime fluctuations in business
activity, employment, and the national income. The applica-
tion of this approach to problems of public policy calls for
deliberate deficit spending by the 'government during depres-
sions, with the objective of raising the national income by
compensating for deficiencies in private spending and by
stimulating increases in the latter, the deficit being achieved
mainly by increasing government expenditures, but also by
reducing taxes, or, at any rate, by refraining from raising the
latter to cover the increased expenditures.
But however useful this approach may be for problems of
public policy at other times, its usefulness in financing an
'all-out' war seems questionable. When government spending
is limited almost solely by the availability of productive re-
sources, we do not need to be greatly concerned over the
danger of reducing the national income by an excessive con-
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despite a substantial propensity to save. To the extent that
•taxation forcescivilianstorelease productive resources
through curtailing their private spending, increased resources
tend to be made available for the military effort. Government
spending can be relied upon to be sufficient to force the na-
tional income to its realizable maximum almost regardless
reductions in private spending, for it will absorb the re-
sources released.
The only important qualification is that reductions in
private spending may release some resources that are not
useful for military purposes. If a theatrical performance is
going to be presented, vacant seats do not add directly or in-
directly to our resources for fighting. The possibility of such
wastes is real, and every effort should be made to minimize
them, even by subsidizing goods and services which do not
compete with the war program, as has been done in Ger-
many. But some wastage of resources and some unemploy-
ment of men and capital facilities operate powerfully to in-
duce the transfer of resources to industries serving the war.
Moreover, the danger that taxtion will cause needless cur-
tailment of private spending is greater in the degree that the
war calls mainly for highly specialized goods and skills. In
the last analysis, however, there are relatively few skills, fac-
tories, materials, and other resources that cannot be har-
nessed, directly or indirectly, to an 'all-out' war. Given the
organizing ability and the time required to put them where
they can serve best, a very great proportion of our total re-
sources can contribute to the war. A federal budget that calls
for military expenditures of $70 billion in a single year,
which approaches one-half of the nation's expected gross
product, must obviously draw upon •a very wide array of
resources. The useful expenditure of anything like this sum
will itself be possible only if curtailment in private spending
is widespread. In view of the mounting demands of the war
in midsummer 1942, and the rapidly maturing technical
organization for their satisfaction, we may conclude that the154 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
practical danger of wasting productive resources by an exces-
sive reduction in private spending, brought about by severe
taxation, had by then become remote.
The concept of an inflationary gap is nevertheless useful.7
Several varieties of this concept may be distinguished, but
for our present purpose it is best regarded as the amount by
which the dollar volume of spending must be curtailed to
avoid an inflationary rise in prices. In other words, it is useful
because it focuses attention upon the size of one of the most
important, though not the sole, of the tasks of wartime fiscal
policy—to avoid inflation. But the tendency of many persons
to identify the estimated inflationary gap with the desirable
additional tax revenues is objectionable on several grounds.
In the first place, a given inflationary gap may be closed by
other methods than taxation, in whole or in part, such as
further rationing or greater coercion or outright compulsion
in lending. In the second place, apart from the objective of
preventing inflation, the growth in the public debt should
be minimized. Taxation greater than the minimum amounts
needed to close the inflationary gap may be desirable for the
latter reason. In the third place, different types of tax exert
varying degrees of restrictive effect upon private spending, so
that the additional tax revenues required to close a given
inflationary gap, assuming that taxation alone were to be
used, might be larger or smaller, depending upon the types
of taxation contemplated. Heavy taxes on business profits and
on large personal incomes do not powerfully curtail private
consumption, since they are paid at the expense of savings,
in considerable degree. Hence a disproportionately large in-
crease in tax revenues would be required if increases in these
taxes were being relied upon to effect the needed curtailment;
though the extra revenues would serve the highly useful
purpose of retarding the growth of the public debt. We
conclude that the estimated size of the inflationary gap at
any time is of great significance for the determination of
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it is a mistake to regard the gap as an appropriate measure,
by itself, of the desirable amount of taxation, or to regard
taxation as the one possible method of closing the gap.
8 DESIRABLE AMOUNTS OF BORROWING
On the basis of all the different issues, is it possible to arrive
at an ideal combination of taxation and borrowing—the pro-
portions or amounts that would be universally most desirable?
The answer is clearly no. There is no one combination of
taxation and borrowing that would be ideal under all con-
ditions. The relative importance of the various factors which
should influence our choice is not always the At one
time, greater weight may be given to minimizing postwar
fiscal and monetary burdens by more vigorous taxation in
lieu of borrowing; at another time, maintaining public
morale may justly exert greater influence, and may warrant
a relatively larger resort to borrowing. No single criterion
is decisive under all circumstances. Even the urgent desira-
bility of avoiding inflation is not by itself a sufficient test:
on the one hand, a moderate rise in prices might be prefera-
ble to the dislocation.s and impairment of incentives that
might ensue from a violent increase in taxes; and on the other
hand, inflation may be fought with other weapons, including
borrowing itself, particularly when compulsory or reinforced
by rationing. The determination of the most suitable amounts
and proportions of taxation and borrowing under any given
circumstances is a matter of art as much as of science.
Are there any grounds, nevertheless, on which we can
approach an estimate of the desirable amounts of borrowing
in the present circumstances? Some rough indications have
already been suggested. First, we would like to avoid so large
a volume of voluntary borrowing that a substantial degree
of inflation would be stimulated. Very great reliance upon
borrowing would tend toward inflation because the accom-
panying curtailment of private spending would be inade-
quate. Second, we do not wish to borrow even as much as156 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
might be non-inflationary, if we can avoid it, because of the
fiscal and monetary difficulties created for the future. Third,
we noted some positive reasons for preferring certain amounts
of borrowing in lieu of taxation. We noted the desirability
of minimizing disruption to programs for personal and fam-
ily security, and for maintaining the financial strength of
private business organizations; likewise, the desirability of
fostering morale and maintaining private economic incen-
tives. To these might be added certain equitable considera-
tions, such as the merit of providing future compensation for
those from whom extraordinary sacrifices are now being ex-
acted. All these purposes may be furthered by issuing govern-
ment securities instead of tax receipts in exchange for a portion
of the private funds the government absorbs. Rough esti-
mates of the borrowing, rather than taxation, that would be
desirable to takecare of these types of needs can be made:
i) The net excess of receipts over disbursements of life in-
surance companies approximates $1.5billionannually.
It would be desirable to borrow these funds from the
insurance companies, rather than to tax them away in
the hands of the policyholders. The life insurance com-
panies themselves may not directly invest the entire $1.5
billion in government securities; but, assuming the ab-
sence of new issues of non-government securities and the
unavailability of mortgages on new construction, all their
additional investments would have to consist of either
government obligations or old securities previously owned
by others. To the extent that they buy old securities, the
sellers come into possession of funds for which no im-
portant avenues of investment will be open other than
government obligations.
2)Additions to individual savings in the form of cur-
rency and bank deposits have been exceeding $3.5 billion
a year.8 The mere fact that the volume of money and
bank deposits in the country has been increasing would
tend to add to the liquid balances of individuals, because
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they, rather than business concerns, commonly hold the
hulk of such ba]ances. Nevertheless, the growth in recent
years, until i 940,wasnot accompanied by lasting price
increases and seemed to reflect a stronger desire to hold
wealth in liquid form. If individuals, in response to an
urge for liquidity, continue to make additions of this
size to their savings in this form, more securities can
properly be sold to commercial banks. Indeed, the one
way in which the demand for additional cash balances
can be met is by creating new money.
3)Most individuals will be prevented by priorities from
making extensive repairs and from building or buying
new houses. Some $1.5billionmay be allowed as addi-
tional gross savings for satisfying these needs later. Doubt-
less many individuals who would ordinarily have bought
houses will not save in cash or in government bonds
the full amount they wOuld have invested in the houses,
but will use some of it in other ways. Many other poten-
tial home-buyers, however, will accumulate such funds,
particularly because several important competing uses,
such as automobiles, will not be available, and because
of the bond-selling campaigns.
4)Business enterprises, in order that their financial in-
tegrity may be maintained, should obtain assets, cash or
securities mainly, corresponding to the unreplaced de-
preciation and depletion of their capital assets and the
net liquidation of their inventories, the aggregate of
which for the fiscal year 1943maybe about billion.
An additional $ibillionmay be allowed for reinvested
profits.
5)Private assets needed to offset the unreplaced deprecia-
tion of farm machinery and buildings would amount to
about $i billion. Actual depreciation accounting is not
common, and the limitations imposed by priorities upon
the replacement expenditures would merely release such
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will at least mentally be ear-marked for future replace-
ments.
6) To all these provisions for maintaining the financial
security of individuals and businessenterprises,the
government might add perhaps $6.5 billion of borrowing
in lieu of taxation in order to foster and sustain a high
state of public morale. billionof securities
could be considered an offset against the unreplaced de-
preciation of private passenger automobiles and other
consumer durable goods, replacement of which will be
impossible for most people during the war; and the
$2 billion could be viewed as a provision for stimulating
and rewarding extra exertions.
The figures summarized in Table 12 are estimates of the
borrowing that can be justified on various specific grounds
apart from the question of inflation. Were there a conflict
between the borrowing deemed desirable on these positive
grounds and the limitations imposed by the threat of in-
flation, a powerful reason would exist for less borrowing.
But in the present situation, it is probable that significantly
more borrowing than the total indicated could be under-
taken without inflationary consequences. The greater part
of the amounts listed in Table 12 represents funds that
would be saved in any event, the normal investment outlets
for which will be temporarily unavailable. In the absence
of heavier taxation than that officially proposed, it is likely
that 'voluntary' savings would substantially exceed $20 bil-
lion, particularly if the rapid extension of direct govern-
mental restrictions upon private spending continues.
Nevertheless, were borrowing limited to roughly the total
in Table 12 and the remainder of the potential savings taxed
away, the private capital assets of individuals and enterprises
in the United States would be increased during the fiscal
year i 943 by a net amount of some $12 billion, a greater sum
than the aggregate capital formation in this country in any
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the sums representing the unreplaced depreciation of con-
sumer durable goods, the net increase in private wealth would
be substantially greater than that of any recent year. Such
borrowing would seem ample for maintaining morale and
TABLE 12
Estimated Government Borrowing *Sufficientin the Fiscal Year
1943toprovide Private Offsets to Unreplaced Depreciation and
to make greater Net Additions to Private Capital Assets than
in any Preceding Year.
To provide offsets against unreplaced depreciation of capital goods
BILLIONS OF
CURRENT DOLLARS
Business plant & equipment
Net liquidation of business inventories 2.5
Farm machinery & buildings i.o
Residential housing 1.5
Sub-Total 8.o
To provide net additions to private capital assetsto offset unreplaced de-
preciation of consumer durable goods
Additions to:
life insurance equities 1.5
cash balances of individuals 3.5
Extra savings of individuals 2.5
To offset depreciation of:
passenger automobiles 2.5
other consumer durable goods 2.0
Sub-Total 12.0
TotalBorrowing 20.0
* Otherthan that arising from the issue of Treasury securities to the Social
Security and other government trust funds.
economic incentives. Yet, if public borrowing were to be
limited to $20 billion, tax revenues and trust fund receipts
for the fiscal year 1943wouldhave to approximate $56 bil-
lion, as compared with $14 billion in the year ended June
30, 1942.i6o FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
United States Budget for Relies Largely upon Voluntary
Restriction of Private Spending
Major reliance upon the voluntary restriction of private
spending was implicit in President Roosevelt's Budget Mes-
sage of January 7, 1g42. By rearranging certain of the budget
figures (Table 13) we see that tax revenues and the net re-
TABLE 13
Dependence upon Voluntary Curtailment of Private Spending
Implied in Federal Budgets for 1942 and
(billions of current dollars)
FISCAL YEAR
1942a%943 b
Totalfederal expencifturescxci. debtretirement and non-
cash outlays but mci. net outlays of government corpora-
tions(roughly equals the amount of private money income
to be immobilized or absorbed, assuming the national in-
come to be at its immediately realizable maximum) d 34 76
Less: Total federal tax collections, mci. net receipts of gov-
ernmental trust funds, and miscellaneous receipts, assuming
enactment of new laws to raise $7 billion in '943 in addi-
tional ordinary revenues and $2 billion in additions to the
social security trust funds 14 28
Remainder: Dependence upon voluntary restrictions of private
spending, represented by sales of government obligations to
savers and banks d 20 48
Based on Daily Treasury Statement figures.
bBasedupon the President's budget message of January 7, 1942,andrevised
budget estimates issued April 24, 1942.
Does not include amounts advanced by federal government to government
corporations for debt redemption nor federal securities transferred to Old
Age and other government trust funds in payment of congressional appro-
priations and of interest on their holdings of government securities.
dTheneeded amount of private curtailment is somewhat overstated because
some federal expenditures, roughly estimated at $5 billion in 1943, do not
represent commensurate drafts upon the country's current productive capac-
ity. Such outlays include so-called transfer expenditures, such as relief and
interest payments, purchases of land, pre-payments for goods to be produced
in the future, and expenditures outside of continental United States.
Private spending here covers all non-federal spending, including that of
state and local governments, and private money income refers to the gross
money incomes of all recipients other than the federal government.AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING i6i
ceipts of governmental trust funds provided for only 40 per
cent of the government's total outlays in the fiscal year
1942; and that these sources, after allowance for additional
receipts of $7 billion from proposed new tax legislation and
$2 billion from proposed increases in the levies made for the
Social Security trust funds, were expected to provide for
only 37 per cent in the fiscal year 1943. The remainder was
to be borrowed from the public and the banks, presumably
on a voluntary basis. As we have indicated, part of the funds
might be lent the government directly by the savers; part,
by the savings banks, life insurance companies, and other
institutions through which individuals are wont to invest
their savings; and funds equal to the portion of the voluntary
savings the savers prefer to hold in the form of currency
and commercial bank deposits might properly be borrowed
from commercial banks.
Unless our estimates of the practicable increase in the out-
put of real goods and services should prove substantially too
low, nearly all this borrowing would have to represent a
commensurate curtailment in the spending of private money
incomes if a very marked rise in the price level is to be
avoided. In other words, the government's program at the
beginning of the fiscal year 1943 implicitly contemplated
that not much less than $48 billion of private money in-
comes would be 'voluntarily' saved. But such enormous re-
liance upon voluntary saving is exceedingly dangerous. On
the one hand, drastically greater resort to rationing and other
direct restrictions upon private spending would doubtless
be essential to realize any such amount of 'voluntary' saving.
On the other hand, the very retention by consumers and
enterprises of any such amount of surplus money income
would itself undermine the price and rationing restrictions.
The budget for the fiscal year 1943 contemplates an in-
crease of approximately $14 billion, or ioo per cent, in tax
and trust fund receipts over those of 1942; although the in-
creases contemplated by the President in the social security162 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
and other levies were still not enacted by the opening of
that year on July i, 1942. A further increase in taxes of any-
thing like $28 billion, which would be necessaryto reduce
the year's public borrowing to about $20 billion, may well
be impracticable, nor isit essential to prevent inflation.
Nevertheless, the situation at the close of the fiscal year 1942
urgently called for substantial steps in this direction. With-
out further steps, the government would be relying upon
some two and one-third times as much voluntary abstention
from the spending of private money incomes as it had in the
preceding year, during which the price level rose materially.
Such great reliance upon voluntary saving seems dangerously
excessive. During most of the fiscal year 1942, our economy
had the benefit of a high rate of production of consumer
goods and of large accumulated stocks. Long before the close
of the fiscal year 1943, in contrast, the output of these goods
will have been reduced and great inroads will have been
made upon the accumulated stocks. Under these conditions,
consumers will be under strong pressure to increase the
dollar volume of their spending in a foredoomed attempt
more nearly to maintain their former standards of con-
sumption. This pressure will constitute a serious threat to
our rationing and price controls and to the stability of the
price level. In July 1942thefiscal outlook was such that
even if psychological and other obstacles barred adequate re-
sort to enlarged taxation, consideration of alternative and
supplementary means to ensure a sufficient absorption of
money incomes seemed urgent.
9 COMPULSORY LOANS
One advantage of compulsory over voluntary fiscal methods—
taxation and forced loans over voluntary lending—is the
greater equity achieved in the sharing of current sacrifices.
Compulsion involves less regard for the finer differences in
individual needs than does voluntary lending, but it removes
differences in character and patriotism as sources of differ-AMOUNTS OF TAXATION AND BORROWING 163
ences in current sacrifice. The ignorant, weak, or selfish man
who does not voluntarily curtail his private spending in order
to respond more generously to appeals for voluntary loans is
forced to do his share when he is taxed and lending is com-
pulsory.
The most outstanding advantage of compulsory fiscal meth-
ods is that they leave lighter burdens for the future. Doubt-
less the government could obtain a substantial sum from the
public during wartime solely by an appeal to patriotism,
by a voluntary loan without interest and with highly re-
stricted negotiability. But if the public is to be induced to
lend great sums every month for months on end on a volun-
tary basis, the terms must be such as will appeal to the
private interests of the investors. This means that the loans
must bear substantial rates of interest and be either freely
transferable or redeemable by the holder on short notice. In
contrast to such loans, a compulsory loan may bear little
or no interest, may be repayable only at times and under
conditions the government deems favorable, and may not
be transferable. The extreme form of fiscal compulsion is
represented by the tax receipt, which is merely evidence of
a closed transaction.
As between taxation and compulsory lending, the former
is greatly to be preferred for all except unusual purposes. A
compulsory loan possesses much of the odium and inflexibil-
ity of a tax without the latter's clear-cut advantage of avoid-
ing a debt. It is less effective than taxation in curtailing
private spending because it provides securities which serve
some of the same private purposes as other forms of saving,
thereby causing a reduction in the latter.
Nevertheless, compulsory loans may be used to great ad-
vantage for special purposes:
i) When taxation has been carried so far that further in-
creases would seriously impair the economic incentives
to exertion and output, compulsory loans offer the stim-
ulus of a reward without increasing private purchasing164 FISCALPLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
power in the present, and they do so on terms more
favorable to the government than could be obtained
through a voluntary loan. A current example is to be
found in Great Britain's treatment of excess profits: al-
though a tax of ioo per cent is imposed during the war
on all profits in excess of the prewar average, 20 per cent
of this tax will be remitted after the war.
2) Compulsory loans are useful in that they bring deferred
rewards to those who, because of unusual present exertion
coupled with unavoidable and otherwise unrewarded
present hardship, deserve additional compensation as a
matter of equity. When Great Britain lowered the per-
sonal exemptions and allowances for dependents under
her individual income tax of 1941, with a resulting in-
crease in hardship for members of the lower income
groups, who, at the same time, were being asked to work
more hours, provision was made for the return 90
per cent of the tax at the end of the war. Time and one-
half or other overtime rates of pay may well be needed
to stimulate extra exertion among workers in various in-
dustries in the United States, but if such overtime pay
took the form of non-negotiable government obligations
payable after the close of the war, the maintenance of extra
incentives would not be accompanied by greater current
spending power.
Whenfurther increases in taxes would cause dangerous
controversy concerning the distribution of the additional
burdens, compulsory loans may be a palatable com-
promise. Compared with additional taxation, they may
serve to postpone the distribution of the burden. And,
because compulsory loans may conceivably be interest-
free or bear a very low rate, and because the times and
methods of repayment may be arranged to favor the
government, they may be so devised as to create much
smaller future fiscal and monetary problems than a similar
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A danger, as well as an advantage, of compulsory loans is
that all classes would prefer them to taxes, i.e., they may be
used to excess, at the expense of taxation. Many members of
the upper income groups may naturally be expected to favor
almost any kind of borrowing over taxation, unless inflation
were acutely feared, because increased taxation threatens
their relative economic position, whereas borrowing tends
to preserve it. The lower income groups are also apt to
favor compulsory loans because they can hope through them
to improve their future economic position without apprecia-
bly worsening their present position. That is, members of the
lower income groups can hope to obtain government securi-
ties or restricted Postal Savings or social security deposits in
return for funds they would otherwise have had to pay in
taxes anyhow. In addition, they would doubtless seek to have
the whole scheme of compulsory loans placed on a kind of
reversed graduated basis: As in Great Britain today, the
loan portion of each taxpayer's total compulsory payments
to the government would vary inversely with the individual
income, a greater part of the poor man's combined tax and
loan liability being represented by the loan than of the
wealthy man's.
When compulsory loans are viewed primarily as alterna-
tives to voluntary loans rather than as alternatives to taxa-
tion, the case for them becomes especially strong; and in this
light they offer very interesting possibilities. Caution in their
use is indicated, however, by our small experience and by
the ease with which they could be used to excess. A portion
of all income payments to individuals could conceivably be
required to be paid in a special type of government security,
which employers and other disbursers of incomes could pur-
chase from the Treasury, the self-employed being required
to purchase commensurate amounts from their net incomes.
These special government securities might be non-interest
bearing or might bear a very low rate. To mitigate the addi-
tional burden upon those who are already saving substantiali66 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
proportions of their incomes, and to avoid undue hardship
on taxpayers with unusual responsibilities, special allowances
might be made. For example, the new securities might be
made receivable, within limits, for the purchase of ordinary
government bonds and for the payment of life insurance and
annuity premiums, the insurance companies to have the
privilege of exchanging them at the Treasury for ordinary
government bonds or a combination of such bonds and cash.
Somewhat similar provision could be made for the use of
the securities by taxpayers to meet other types of contractual
obligation, such as mortgage installments on residences, and
other debts. Reductions in the compulsory loan liability
could be made for extraordinary medical expenses, burial
expenses, etc.
10 REDUCTION IN FEDERAL NON-MILITARY EXPENDITURES
Our borrowing and tax revenue requirements could be re-
duced if federal non-military expenditures were further cur-
tailed. In the President's budget message a reduction of ap-
proximately $i.billionwas contemplated for all non-military
outlays for the fiscal year 1943,exceptinterest on the public
debt. The possibilities of further reductions are examined
in the Appendix.
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